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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Texas case law relating to oil, gas, and 
mineral law from August 1, 2017 to July 31, 2018.  
II. Case Law 
A. Fraction of Royalties 
1. US Shale Energy II LLC et al v. Laborde Properties, LP.
1
  
A nonparticipating royalty is: 
an interest in minerals which is nonpossessory in that it does not 
entitle the owner to produce the minerals himself, or permit him 
to join in leases of the mineral estate to which the royalty is 
appurtenant, and does not entitle the owner to share in the bonus 
or delay rentals, if any, paid for such lease. It merely entitles the 
owner to a certain share of the production under said lease free 
of expenses of exploration and production.
2
 
Because the nonparticipating royalty interest burdens the lease royalty, it 
is necessary to carefully examine the drafting language associated with 
reserving or conveying the same. While the differences are subtle, the 
results can be dramatic.  
In US Shale Energy II LLC et al v. Laborde , LP
3
, the Texas Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether specific language in a deed 
reserved fixed or floating nonparticipating royalty.  
In 1951, the Bryan family sold their mineral interest in a tract of land in 
Karnes County, excepting and reserving therefrom “an undivided one-half 
(1/2) interest in and to [the royalty] . . . in and under . . . the above 
described premises, the same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the 
production.”
4
 Laborde Properties LP bought the tract in 2010.
5
 At that time, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 551 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. 2018). 
 2. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 
1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citation omitted). 
 3. 551 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. 2018). 
 4. Id. at 150. 
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the Bryan successors were being paid one-half (1/2) of a one-fifth (1/5) 




 Laborde argued that 
this payment was incorrect, and that, based on the reservation language in 






The trial court sided with the Bryan successors, but in 2016, the Fourth 
Court of Appeals in San Antonio reversed, ruling the language “the same 
being equal to one-sixteenth of the production” had shown an intent to 
reserve a fixed royalty interest.
8
  
The Texas Supreme Court looked to “the language and structure of the 
reservation at issue” as its “sole guide in ascertaining the intent of the 
parties,” and in a 6-3 decision, ruled that the deed in question reserved “a 
floating 1/2 interest in the royalty in all oil, gas, or other minerals” 
produced from the property.
9
  
In its analysis, the court sought to reconcile the two clauses in the 
reservation: “an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to the Oil Royalty,” 
and “the same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production.”
10
 The 
majority started with the proposition that the first phrase expressed the 
parties’ “intent to tie the reservation to the royalty rate that was in effect at 
any given time,” or to reserve a floating royalty.
11
 When the deed was 
negotiated in 1951, 1/8 was the typical landowner’s royalty rate in oil and 
gas leases; however, the oil and gas lease in this case was not negotiated 
until 2008. Since “the parties could not have intended to tie the reservation 
to something that simply did not exist,” the court ruled that the reservation 




Relying on the fact that 1/8
th
 was the “standard” landowner’s royalty in 
oil and gas leases, the court held that the second clause, “that the same 
being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production,” did not modify the 
plain meaning of the first clause.
13
 The reference to 1/16
th
 clarified “as an 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 151. 
 9. Id. at 150 
 10. Id. at 152. 
 11. Id. at 153. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 160. 
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incidental factual matter, what a ½ interest in the royalty amounted to when 
the deed was executed.”
14
 
This is the first fraction-of-royalty case to reach the Texas Supreme 
Court since Hysaw v. Dawkins,
15
 decided in 2016.  
B. Reservations and Exceptions 
1. Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capital Partners, Ltd.
16
 
In this case, the court distinguished between a reservation and an 
exception. A reservation is used in a deed when the grantor wants to reserve 
something from the conveyance for himself, whether it be a right or an 
ownership interest. An exception notes and preserves a previous reservation 
made in prior deeds, and excludes from the current grant the right, or 
ownership interest which was previously reserved.
17
  
In 1977, Ben Perryman conveyed a tract of land in Montague County to 
his son and daughter-in-law, Gary and Nancy Perryman. The deed 
contained the following language: 
LESS, SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided one-half (1/2) of all 
royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other minerals 
that may be produced from the above described premises which 
are now owned by Grantor.
18
 
At the time of this conveyance, Ben Perryman owned all of the minerals 
and royalty in the land.  
In 1983, Gary and Nancy Perryman conveyed the land to GNP Inc. The 
deed contained the following language: 
LESS, SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided one-half (1/2) of all 
royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other minerals 
that may be produced from the above described premises which 
are now owned by Grantor. It being understood that all of the 
rest of my ownership in and to the mineral estate in and under 
the above described lands is being conveyed hereby.
19
 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. 
 15. See 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016). 
 16. 546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018). 
 17. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, Texas Law of Oil and Gas Ch. 1, § 
3.9[A] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018). 
 18. Perryman, 456 S.W.3d at 114. 
 19. Id. at 114. 
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The deed from Gary and Nancy Perryman to GNP Inc. did not mention 
the prior reservation in the 1977 deed.
20
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with both the trial court and court of 
appeals’ construction of the deed reservation and with the construction 
argued by both sides in the dispute. The court construed the “save and 
except” language of the 1977 deed as a reservation and held that the same 
language in the 1983 deed was not a reservation, but rather an exception to 
the grantor’s warranty of title.
21
  
Holding that the phrase “which are now owned by Grantor” modifies the 
word “premises,” not the phrase “1/2 of the royalties,” the court concluded 
“that the most reasonable grammatical construction of this deed is that the 
clause excepts 1/2 of all royalties from the minerals produced from the 
‘premises which are now owned by grantor.’”
22
 As a result, the 1983 deed 
did not reserve any royalty interest. However, because Ben Perryman 
owned fee simple title at the time of the 1977 deed, “the 1/2 royalty interest 
excepted from the grant necessarily remained with Ben, rather than passing 
to the grantees or remaining outstanding in another.”
23
 “Although Ben’s 
deed did not expressly “reserve” the 1/2 royalty interest for himself, ‘the 




C. Retained Acreage Clauses 
1. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc
25
 and XOG 
Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., Ltd. P’Ship.
26
 
In two separate retained acreage clause cases, the Texas Supreme Court 
interpreted a retained acreage clause to determine ownership of mineral 
rights covered by competing oil and gas leases. The court applied the same 
principles but reached two different outcomes. 
In Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., Endeavor 
acquired several oil and gas leases covering a 640-acre tract of land 
(Section 4), and the north half of an adjoining section (Section 9) to the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 119-20. 
 22. Id. at 121 (emphasis in original). 
 23. Id. at 125. 
 24. Id. at 22 (citing Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)). 
 25. 448 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App. 2014), aff'd, No. 15-0155, 2018 WL 1770290 (Tex. 
Apr. 13, 2018). 
 26. 480 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App. 2015), aff'd, No. 15-0935, 2018 WL 1770506 (Tex. Apr. 
13, 2018). 
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 The leases contained retained acreage clauses.
28
 Endeavor drilled 
four wells: Two in the southeast quarter of Section 4 and two in the 
northeast quarter of Section 9 in the Spraberry (Trend Area) Field.
29
 Upon 
completion of the wells, and prior to the expiration of the primary terms, 
Endeavor filed certified proration plats with the Texas Railroad 
Commission.
30
 Each plat designated approximately 81 acres, comprising 
the entire southeast quarter of Section 4 and the northeast quarter of Section 
9.
31
 Endeavor did not include any acreage in either the southwest quarter of 
Section 4 or the northwest quarter of Section 9, as it had not drilled any 
wells in those locations.
32
 After the primary terms of Endeavor’s leases 
expired, Patriot Royalty and Land, LLC reviewed the leases and certified 
proration plats Endeavor filed with the Railroad Commission, and 
concluded that Endeavor’s leases had terminated as to the southwest quarter 
of Section 4 or the northwest quarter of Section 9.
33
 As a result, Patriot 
obtained leases on that acreage and later assigned them to Discovery 
Operating, Inc.
34
 Discovery drilled four wells on that acreage.
35
 Upon 
discovery of the newly drilled wells, Endeavor asserted that, based on the 
retained-acreage clauses, its leases were still valid, and filed new proration 
plats assigning 160 acres to each well.
36
 The new plats included the acreage 
described in Discover’s leases.
37
 Discovery filed a trespass action against 
Endeavor. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
38
 The trial 
court ruled in favor of Discovery.
39
  
At the time of the Endeavor leases, the Railroad Commission’s rules for 
the Spraberry (Trend) Area allowed 80 acres to a proration unit with an 
additional 80 acres of “tolerance acreage” at the operator’s election.
40
 The 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 171-72. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 172-73. 
 30. Id. at 173 
 31. Id. at 173-74. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 174. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 173. 
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The Endeavor leases’ retained acreage clauses stated:  
[T]his lease shall automatically terminate . . . save and except those lands 
and depths located within a governmental proration unit assigned to a well 
[containing] the number of acres required to comply with the applicable 
rules and regulations of the Railroad Commission of Texas for obtaining 
the maximum producing allowable for the particular well.
42
Relying on the 
retained acreage clauses, Discovery argued that Endeavor’s leases had 
expired as to the lands outside of the 81-acre proration units that Endeavor 
originally formed and filed with the Railroad Commission.
43
 Endeavor 
argued that it retained 160 acres around each well because its leases’ 
references to “maximum producing allowable” meant that each proration 
unit automatically consists of the greatest amount of acreage permitted 
under the Railroad Commission rules.
44
 
The court first addressed the phrase “proration unit assigned to a well” 
and concluded that it is not the Railroad Commission’s responsibility to 
review and unilaterally assign acreage to proration units; rather, the lessee 
assigns the proration acreage through its regulatory filings with the Railroad 
Commission.
45
 If the lessee’s filings conform with the qualifications of the 




Next, the court addressed the clause “maximum producing allowable”. 
Endeavor argued that the phrase meant that Endeavor’s retained proration 
units must automatically consist of 160 acres, despite the fact that their 
original filings with the Railroad Commission only assigned approximately 
81 acres to its wells, “because that amount will result in the ‘maximum 
producing allowable,’”
47
 under the special field rules.
48
 The Court disagreed 
and held that “Endeavor retained exactly what it bargained for: 
approximately 81 acres per well.”
49
  
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 172 
 43. Id. at 176-77. 
 44. Id. at 177. 
 45. Id. at 177-78. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., No. 15-0155, 2018 WL 
1770290 at *11 (Tex. Apr. 13, 2018). 
 48. Id. at *12. 
 49. Id. 
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In conclusion, the court held that Discovery’s leases were in fact valid 
because Endeavor’s leases had terminated as to all acreage outside of the 




XOG Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., Ltd. P’Ship was another 
retained acreage clause case considered by the court this year. In this case, 
the retained acreage clause was included in an assignment of lease from 
XOG to Chesapeake. The assignment provided that, upon expiration of the 
continuous development period in the assignment: 
Said lease shall revert to Assignor, save and except that portion 
of said lease included within the proration or pooled unit of each 
well drilled under this Assignment and producing or capable of 
producing oil and/or gas in paying quantities. The term 
“proration unit” as used herein, shall mean the area within the 
surface boundaries of the proration unit then established or 
prescribed by field rules or special order of the appropriate 
regulatory authority for the reservoir in which each well is 
completed. In the absence of such field rules or special order, 
each proration unit shall be deemed to be 320 acres of land in the 
form of a square as near as practicable surroundings [sic] a well 




Chesapeake completed 6 wells on the lease, 5 of which were located in 
the Allison-Britt (12,350) Field in Wheeler County.
52
 (A sixth gas well was 
completed in a formation with no special field rules.)
53
 There, the field rules 
provided that “no proration unit shall consist of more than three hundred 




Chesapeake filed Form P-15 for each well with the Railroad 
Commission, assigning production acreage totaling 802 acres.
55
 XOG 
argued that the Form P-15 filings limited the acreage retained by 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 448 S.W. 3d at 178-79. 
 51. XOG Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., Ltd. P’Ship, 480 S.W.3d 22, 24-25 
(Tex. App. 2015) (emphasis in original), aff'd, No. 15-0935, 2018 WL 1770506 (Tex. Apr. 
13, 2018). 
 52. See id. at 25. 
 53. Id. at 25-26. 
 54. Id. n.1 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 25-26. 
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Chesapeake to those 802 acres.
56
 Chesapeake argued that “it was the clear 
intent of the parties to retain the amount of acreage prescribed by the 




Applying general contract construction principles, the court held that the 
“plain language of the agreement defines a ‘proration unit’ (and 
concomitantly the retained acreage) as the area prescribed by the applicable 
field rules, or in the absence of field rules, 320 acres – nothing more, 
nothing less.”
58
 Since “the parties expressly agreed that the assignee would 
retain that portion of a given lease included within a ‘proration unit’ for the 
Allison-Britt field, the acreage retained by a given well within that field 
was the standard proration acreage of 320 acres – irrespective of what the 
operator may have designated in a Form P-15 filing.”
59
 
D. Offset Well Clause 
1. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.—USA v. Adams
60
 
In this case, the court decided whether an offset well clause must be 
reasonably calculated to prevent drainage in the context of shale drilling.  
In 2009, Murphy Exploration & Production Company entered into two 
essentially identical oil and gas leases which covered two contiguous 302-
acre tracts in Atascosa County.
61
 The leases contained identical offset well 
clauses, which provided: 
[I]n the event a well is completed as a producer of oil and/or gas 
on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased premises, and 
within 467 feet of the premises covered by this lease, that Lessee 
herein is hereby obligated to . . . commence drilling operations 
on the leased acreage and thereafter continue the drilling of such 
off-set well or wells with due diligence to a depth adequate to 
test the same formation from which the well or wells are 
producing from [sic] the adjacent acreage.
62
 
The offset well clause was triggered when Comstock Oil & Gas, LP 
drilled a producing horizontal well on the tract adjacent to and southwest of 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id 
 57. Id. at 26. 
 58. Id. at 29. 
 59. Id. 
 60. No. 16-0505, 2018 WL 2449313 (Tex. June 1, 2018). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. 
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the tracts covered by the leases.
63
 Although the clause permitted Murphy to 
pay royalties based on the neighboring well’s production or release acreage, 
Murphy instead chose to drill a well on the Herbsts’ tract 2,100 feet from 
the triggering well.
64
 The well was completed in November 2012, and 
Murphy began paying royalties on production.
65
 Here, “[t]he lessors and 
royalty owners under the leases (collectively, Herbst) sued Murphy for 
breach of contract, alleging that Murphy failed to comply with the offset 
[well] provision” because the Murphy well was too far from the lease 
boundary to qualify as an offset well, and was not designed to prevent 
drainage from the Herbsts’ tract.
66
 Murphy argued that the offset well 
provision in the lease did not contain any location or minimum spacing 
requirements for the offset well, but only required that the well be drilled 
“on the leased acreage” and “to a depth adequate to test the same formation 




In a 5-4 opinion, the Court analyzed the oil and gas lease using 
traditional contract principles and held that the offset well clause did not 
require Murphy to drill a well to protect against drainage from the 
neighboring tract.
68
 Thus, Murphy’s well, though located 2,100 feet from 
the triggering well, satisfied the offset well clause.  
The court noted that “the provision’s only specific requirements with 
respect to where to drill ‘such off-set well’ are that it be ‘on the leased 
acreage’ and ‘to a depth adequate to test the same formation’ from which 
the triggering well is producing.
69
 “The clause does not reference 
drainage.”
70
 The court looked to the express language within the four 
corners of the lease agreement, and refused to imply further restrictions. 
Murphy’s leases provided their own definition of “offset well”—when the 
clause was triggered, Murphy was required to drill a well (1) on the 
Herbsts’ tract (2) with due diligence, and (3) to the same depth as the 
triggering well. The drilling of “such offset well” would satisfy the offset 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id.  
 64. See id.  
 65. Id. at *2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at *6-*7. 
 69. Id. at *3.  
 70. Id.  
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 The lease language did not include a proximity requirement 
or an express protection requirement after the term “such offset well”.
72
  
In support of its reasoning, the majority noted that the leases were 
executed in 2009 and drafted with horizontal drilling in the Eagle Ford 
Shale in mind.
73
 Murphy presented expert testimony that drainage is almost 
non-existent from horizontal wells in tight-shale formations like the Eagle 
Ford.
74
 Thus, it was unreasonable for an offset well clause to require a well 
to even attempt to protect against non-existent drainage.  
E. Term Royalty Interest and the Rule Against Perpetuities 
1. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann.
75
 
In 1996, Strieber sold 120 acres in Dewitt County to Koopmann, 
excepting and reserving  
…one-half (1/2) of the royalties from the production of oil, 
gas . . . and all other minerals . . . which reserved royalty interest 
is a non-participating interest and is reserved for the limited term 
of 15 years from the date of this Deed and as long thereafter as 
there is production in paying or commercial quantities.
76
 
The 15-year term ended on December 27, 2011.
77
 At that time, the land 
was under lease to Burlington.
78
 The land had been pooled in a unit, but as 
of August 2011, there had been no production.
79
 Streiber conveyed 60% of 
her reserved term royalty to Burlington “presumably as an incentive to 
motivate Burlington to begin drilling.”
80
 A well had been drilled in 2011, 
but on December 27
th
, that well was not producing.
81
  
Burlington claimed that the Strieber reservation created a future interest 
in the Koopmanns that was void under the rule against perpetuities and that 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at *6-*7. 
 72. Id. at *3, *5-*7. 
 73. Id. at *4.  
 74. Id. at *2.  
 75. 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018), reh'g denied (June 22, 2018). 
 76. Id. at 863.  
 77. See id. at 864. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 863.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 863-64. 
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Burlington’s interest was independently maintained because its activities 
satisfied the deed’s saving clause.
82
  
After providing a lengthy analysis of the Rule and its application, the 
court ultimately adopted modern interpretation of it based on the purpose 
and intent of the rule rather than on an archaic, black letter reading of it, 
holding that, under the specific facts in this case, the Koopmanns’ future 
interest in the NPRI created by the Strieber’s deed was not invalidated by 
the rule against perpetuities.
83
  
[W]here a defeasible term interest is created by reservation, 
leaving an executory interest that is certain to vest in an 
ascertainable grantee, the Rule does not invalidate the grantee’s 
future interest. . . . Our holding does not run afoul of the 
constitution’s prohibition of perpetuities because the future oil 
and gas interest at issue here does not restrain alienability 
indefinitely—to the contrary, giving effect to a future interest 




The court added “[w]e limit our holding to future interests in the oil and 
gas context in which the holder of the interest is ascertainable and the 




                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 864. 
 83. Id. at 880. 
 84. Id. at 873 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. 
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